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  • Committer: Teddy Hogeborn
  • Date: 2014-06-08 03:10:08 UTC
  • Revision ID: teddy@recompile.se-20140608031008-mc9bd7b024a3q0y0
Address a very theoretical possible security issue in mandos-client.

If there were to run some sort of "cleaner" process for /run/tmp (or
/tmp), and mandos-client were to run for long enough for that cleaner
process to remove the temporary directory for GPGME, there was a
possibility that another unprivileged process could trick the (also
unprivileged) mandos-client process to remove other files or symlinks
which the unprivileged mandos-client process was allowed to remove.
This is not currently known to have been exploitable, since there are
no known initramfs environments running such cleaner processes.

* plugins.d/mandos-client.c (main): Use O_NOFOLLOW when opening
                                    tempdir for cleaning.

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# -*- yaml -*-
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---
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Bug-Submit: mailto:mandos-dev@recompile.se
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Changelog: https://bzr.recompile.se/loggerhead/mandos/trunk/view/head:/NEWS
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Contact: mandos@recompile.se
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Documentation: https://www.recompile.se/mandos/man/intro.8mandos
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FAQ: https://www.recompile.se/mandos/man/intro.8mandos#faq
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Name: Mandos
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Other-References: https://www.recompile.se/mandos
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Registration: https://mail.recompile.se/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/mandos-dev
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Repository: https://ftp.recompile.se/pub/mandos/trunk
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Repository-Browse: https://bzr.recompile.se/loggerhead/mandos/trunk/files
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Security-Contact: mandos@recompile.se