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  • Committer: Teddy Hogeborn
  • Date: 2014-06-08 03:10:08 UTC
  • Revision ID: teddy@recompile.se-20140608031008-mc9bd7b024a3q0y0
Address a very theoretical possible security issue in mandos-client.

If there were to run some sort of "cleaner" process for /run/tmp (or
/tmp), and mandos-client were to run for long enough for that cleaner
process to remove the temporary directory for GPGME, there was a
possibility that another unprivileged process could trick the (also
unprivileged) mandos-client process to remove other files or symlinks
which the unprivileged mandos-client process was allowed to remove.
This is not currently known to have been exploitable, since there are
no known initramfs environments running such cleaner processes.

* plugins.d/mandos-client.c (main): Use O_NOFOLLOW when opening
                                    tempdir for cleaning.

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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE legalnotice PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
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        "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd">
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<para>
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  Please report bugs to the Mandos development mailing list:
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  <email>mandos-dev@recompile.se</email> (subscription required).
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  Note that this list is public.  The developers can be reached
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  privately at <email>mandos@recompile.se</email> (OpenPGP key
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  fingerprint <literal>153A 37F1 0BBA 0435 987F 2C4A 7223 2973 CA34
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  C2C4</literal> for encrypted mail).
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</para>