/mandos/release

To get this branch, use:
bzr branch http://bzr.recompile.se/loggerhead/mandos/release

« back to all changes in this revision

Viewing changes to mandos.service

  • Committer: Teddy Hogeborn
  • Date: 2014-06-08 03:10:08 UTC
  • mto: (237.7.272 trunk)
  • mto: This revision was merged to the branch mainline in revision 317.
  • Revision ID: teddy@recompile.se-20140608031008-mc9bd7b024a3q0y0
Address a very theoretical possible security issue in mandos-client.

If there were to run some sort of "cleaner" process for /run/tmp (or
/tmp), and mandos-client were to run for long enough for that cleaner
process to remove the temporary directory for GPGME, there was a
possibility that another unprivileged process could trick the (also
unprivileged) mandos-client process to remove other files or symlinks
which the unprivileged mandos-client process was allowed to remove.
This is not currently known to have been exploitable, since there are
no known initramfs environments running such cleaner processes.

* plugins.d/mandos-client.c (main): Use O_NOFOLLOW when opening
                                    tempdir for cleaning.

Show diffs side-by-side

added added

removed removed

Lines of Context:
 
1
[Unit]
 
2
Description=Server of encrypted passwords to Mandos clients
 
3
 
 
4
[Service]
 
5
Type=simple
 
6
## Type=dbus is not appropriate, because Mandos also needs to announce
 
7
## its ZeroConf service and be reachable on the network.
 
8
#Type=dbus
 
9
BusName=se.recompile.Mandos
 
10
# If you add --no-dbus, also comment out BusName above, and vice versa
 
11
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/mandos --foreground
 
12
Restart=always
 
13
KillMode=process
 
14
## Using socket activation won't work either, because systemd always
 
15
## does bind() on the socket, and also won't announce the ZeroConf
 
16
## service.
 
17
#ExecStart=/usr/sbin/mandos --foreground --socket=0
 
18
#StandardInput=socket
 
19
 
 
20
[Install]
 
21
WantedBy=multi-user.target