/mandos/release

To get this branch, use:
bzr branch http://bzr.recompile.se/loggerhead/mandos/release

« back to all changes in this revision

Viewing changes to debian/mandos-client.postrm

  • Committer: Teddy Hogeborn
  • Date: 2014-06-08 03:10:08 UTC
  • mto: (237.7.272 trunk)
  • mto: This revision was merged to the branch mainline in revision 317.
  • Revision ID: teddy@recompile.se-20140608031008-mc9bd7b024a3q0y0
Address a very theoretical possible security issue in mandos-client.

If there were to run some sort of "cleaner" process for /run/tmp (or
/tmp), and mandos-client were to run for long enough for that cleaner
process to remove the temporary directory for GPGME, there was a
possibility that another unprivileged process could trick the (also
unprivileged) mandos-client process to remove other files or symlinks
which the unprivileged mandos-client process was allowed to remove.
This is not currently known to have been exploitable, since there are
no known initramfs environments running such cleaner processes.

* plugins.d/mandos-client.c (main): Use O_NOFOLLOW when opening
                                    tempdir for cleaning.

Show diffs side-by-side

added added

removed removed

Lines of Context:
debian/mandos-client.postrm
31
31
# Update the initial RAM file system image
32
32
update_initramfs()
33
33
{
34
 
    update-initramfs -u -k all || :
 
34
    if [ -x /usr/sbin/update-initramfs ]; then
 
35
        update-initramfs -u -k all
 
36
    fi
35
37
}
36
38
 
37
39
case "$1" in
43
45
        shred --remove /etc/keys/mandos/seckey.txt 2>/dev/null || :
44
46
        rm --force /etc/mandos/plugin-runner.conf \
45
47
            /etc/keys/mandos/pubkey.txt \
46
 
            /etc/keys/mandos/seckey.txt \
47
 
            /etc/keys/mandos/dhparams.pem 2>/dev/null
 
48
            /etc/keys/mandos/seckey.txt 2>/dev/null
48
49
        update_initramfs
49
50
        ;;
50
51
    upgrade|failed-upgrade|disappear|abort-install|abort-upgrade)