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  • Committer: Teddy Hogeborn
  • Date: 2014-06-08 03:10:08 UTC
  • mto: (237.7.272 trunk)
  • mto: This revision was merged to the branch mainline in revision 317.
  • Revision ID: teddy@recompile.se-20140608031008-mc9bd7b024a3q0y0
Address a very theoretical possible security issue in mandos-client.

If there were to run some sort of "cleaner" process for /run/tmp (or
/tmp), and mandos-client were to run for long enough for that cleaner
process to remove the temporary directory for GPGME, there was a
possibility that another unprivileged process could trick the (also
unprivileged) mandos-client process to remove other files or symlinks
which the unprivileged mandos-client process was allowed to remove.
This is not currently known to have been exploitable, since there are
no known initramfs environments running such cleaner processes.

* plugins.d/mandos-client.c (main): Use O_NOFOLLOW when opening
                                    tempdir for cleaning.

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  is possible to verify that the correct password will be received by
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  this client by running the command, on the client:
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        /usr/lib/mandos/plugins.d/mandos-client \
 
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        /usr/lib/$(dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_MULTIARCH \
 
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        )/mandos/plugins.d/mandos-client \
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                --pubkey=/etc/keys/mandos/pubkey.txt \
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                --seckey=/etc/keys/mandos/seckey.txt; echo
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  work, "--options-for=mandos-client:--connect=<ADDRESS>:<PORT>" needs
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  to be manually added to the file "/etc/mandos/plugin-runner.conf".
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 -- Teddy Hogeborn <teddy@recompile.se>, Sun, 23 Jun 2013 17:31:53 +0200
 
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 -- Teddy Hogeborn <teddy@recompile.se>, Mon, 28 Oct 2013 11:02:26 +0100